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Abstract 
During the global financial turmoil of 2007 and 2008, no major derivative clearing house 
in the world encountered distress while many banks were pushed to the brink and beyond. 
An important reason for this is that derivative exchanges have avoided using value at 
risk, normal distributions and linear correlations. This is an important lesson. The global 
financial crisis has also taught us that in risk management, robustness is more important 
than sophistication and that it is dangerous to use models that are over calibrated to 
short time series of market prices. The paper applies these lessons to the important 
exchange traded derivatives in India and recommends major changes to the current 
margining systems to improve their robustness. It also discusses directions in which 
global best practices in exchange risk management could be improved to take advantage 
of recent advances in computing power and finance theory. The paper argues that risk 
management should evolve towards explicit models based on coherent risk measures (like 
expected shortfall), fat tailed distributions and non linear dependence structures 
(copulas). 
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Risk Management Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis 
for Derivative Exchanges
* 
I. Derivative exchanges fared far better than banks  
As in many other crises, during the global financial turmoil of 2007 and 2008 also, it was 
true that no major derivative clearing house in the world encountered distress while many 
banks were pushed to the brink and beyond.  This was despite the fact that the exchanges 
deal with more volatile underlyings – equities are about twice as volatile as real estate and 
natural gas is about ten times more volatile than real estate. Clearly, risk management at 
the world’s leading exchanges proved to be superior to that of the banks. The most 
important lesson from the financial turmoil of 2007 and 2008 is that the quality of risk 
management models does matter.  
Exchanges and their clearing houses have weathered the storm very well thanks to their 
superior risk management models. Yet, complacency is not warranted as exchanges start 
trading more complex derivatives with asymmetric and lumpy payoffs.  
Since the early 1990s, there have been three major advances in the theoretical foundations 
of risk management: 
1.  abandoning Value at Risk (VaR) in favour of coherent risk measures like 
Expected Shortfall (ES); 
2.  moving away from the normal distribution to fatter tailed distributions; and 
3.  discarding linear correlations measures in favour of copula based models of tail 
dependence. 
The cumulative effect of these three advances is so great that we must today regard the 
risk measurement methodologies developed in the early 1990s as largely obsolete. 
Banking regulations are however still stuck in the models of early 1990s vintage. What 
we have seen in 2007 and 2008 is that VaR models based on normal distributions and 
linear correlations models do not work.  
The derivative exchanges have a huge advantage in that the SPAN
1 system that most of 
them use is a coherent risk measure unlike the VaR system used by banking regulators. 
                                                 
*  © Prof. Jayanth R. Varma, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad 380 015. 
jrvarma@iimahd.ernet.in 
1  SPAN (Standard Portfolio Analysis of Risk) is a portfolio margining method developed by the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange in 1988. It calculates the portfolio loss under several price and 
volatility scenarios and determines the margin based on these loss levels.  
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The SPAN risk measure can also be interpreted as an ES measure under certain 
simplifying distributional assumptions. Additional layers of capital requirements and 
other regulations might bring the exchanges’ risk models even closer to a realistic ES 
measure.  
Thus derivative exchanges have explicitly incorporated one of the three theoretical 
advances of the last two decades. The other two advances may also be implicitly taken 
into account by some exchanges. As the SPAN system does not explicitly specify how the 
Price Scanning Range (PSR) is to be determined, exchanges are free to use fat tailed 
distributions while deciding on the PSR. Moreover, exchanges are usually quite 
conservative in fixing margin offsets for inter-commodity spreads. They may implicitly 
treat linear correlations with a pinch of salt while deciding on these offsets. The very 
success of the derivative clearing corporations world wide suggests that they have 
implicitly factored in fat tails and non linear dependence structures at least to some 
extent.  
The global turmoil has also demonstrated the benefits of robust risk models. There is a 
great difference between risk management models and valuation models. By their very 
nature, valuation models need to be heavily parametrized and calibrated to market prices. 
Increasing sophistication and complexity does lead to greater model risk, but this is 
unavoidable, because trading at even slightly wrong prices can be disastrous for a 
financial intermediary.  
Risk management models on the other hand do not need to be so highly calibrated and 
parametrized. Crudeness (leaning towards conservatism) is less of a problem in risk 
management because unlike in valuation, here it only locks up capital for some time; it 
does not impact the transaction price itself. Robustness is far more important than 
sophistication and market calibration for risk management models. 
Another important lesson from the ongoing Global Financial Crisis is that models 
calibrated to short time periods from a benign economic environment can fail disastrously 
when the economic environment becomes more adverse. While stress tests could be part 
of the solution to this problem, a more fundamental approach is to calibrate to very long 
time periods even if such a time period cuts across one or more structural breaks in the 
data. What can be regarded as a structural break in a valuation model is often best 
regarded as a regime switching in a risk management model – the implication being that 
regime switches could reverse as well. Risk management is designed to deal with rare  
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events, and the probability of such events can be estimated only by examining long 
historical stretches of data. 
Section II of this paper discusses VaR and ES models in greater detail; Section III 
discusses the issues of robustness, regime switching and the associated question of risk 
levels; Section IV discusses the implications of this analysis for some important 
derivative markets in India. Section V is more speculative in nature as it considers 
potential new advances in risk modelling techniques that are becoming feasible in the 
light of continuing advances in mathematics and statistics as well as the relentless decline 
in computation costs. 
II. VaR, Coherent Risk Measures and Expected Shortfall 
The 99% VaR at a daily horizon can be defined in the following different equivalent 
ways
2: 
1.  It is the level of capital that is sufficient to absorb the possible loss on 99% of the 
days. 
2.  It is the level of loss that is exceeded only on 1% of the days. 
3.  It is the worst of the best 99% of possible outcomes. 
4.  It is the best of the worst 1% of possible outcomes. 
5.  Unless the distribution has a hump in the tail, the 99% VaR is also the most likely 
of the worst 1% of possible outcomes. 
The first two interpretations of VaR given above make VaR an intuitively appealing and 
interesting summary measure of risk and account for its popularity among regulators, 
managers and others.  
The third and fourth interpretations of VaR highlight the serious difficulties with the 
concept of VaR. For example, the fourth definition says that 99% VaR is essentially the 
best of the worst 1% of outcomes. This immediately appears unsatisfactory – why not the 
worst of the worst 1% of outcomes or at least the average of the worst 1% of outcomes?  
It is easy to see that worst of the worst 1% is not a meaningful measure of risk because 
the worst outcome may be unbounded. For example, a derivatives dealer that has sold a 
                                                 
2  These different definitions are equivalent if the loss distribution is continuous. If the distribution 
is discrete or discontinuous, then these definitions may not all be equivalent. In this paper, the 
loss distribution is assumed to be continuous to keep the discussion simple.  
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futures contract or sold a call option on a stock index faces potentially unlimited losses on 
the position. There is no theoretical limit to how high the stock index can rise during the 
life of the contract and the potential losses are therefore unbounded. The worst possible 
outcome is thus ∞ − (minus infinity). This is a meaningless measure of risk for most 
practical purposes
3. 
The average of the worst 1% of possible outcomes is however a well defined and 
meaningful measure of risk. In the risk literature, this is referred to as expected shortfall 
(ES), conditional VaR (CVaR) or tail conditional expectation (TCE)
4.  
The distinction between VaR and ES is not very important if the loss distribution is 
normal. For a normal distribution, the ES is  ( )
() y N
y n
− 1
 where y is the VaR. This is 
asymptotically the same as VaR because  () ( )
y
y n
= y N –
y
1 lim
∞ →
. 
For non normal distributions, VaR can be quite different from ES. Consider for example 
two securities firms that both have a one-day VaR of Rs 10 million at the 99% level. The 
ES measure asks the question as to what happens on the 1% of days when the loss 
exceeds Rs 10 million. It is possible that in one case, the loss ranges from Rs 10 million 
to Rs 15 million with an average of Rs 12 million. In the other case, the loss may range 
from Rs 10 million to Rs 20 million with an average of Rs 15 million. Clearly, the second 
firm is a lot riskier than the first though both have the same VaR. The ES measure (Rs 15 
million as compared to Rs 12 million) reveals this picture very well. 
Though the average of the worst (ES) is a better measure of risk than the best of the worst 
(VaR), VaR is very popular among financial institutions and their regulators. On the other 
hand, no derivative exchange in the world uses VaR for margining purposes (Artzner et 
al, 1999). 
ES is the most important example of a coherent risk measure.  Artzner et al (1999) 
proposed four axioms for coherent risk measures: 
                                                 
3  It implies for example that a dealer that has sold one call option has the same level of risk as a 
dealer that has sold a thousand call options. The worst possible outcome for both is minus 
infinity. 
4  Strictly speaking these different terms are not identical if the loss distribution is discrete or 
discontinuous. However, as explained in footnote  above, the loss distribution is assumed to be 
continuous throughout this paper.  
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1.  Translation invariance: Adding an initial sure amount to the portfolio reduces risk by 
the same amount. 
2.  Sub additivity: “Merger does not create extra risk”  
3.  Positive Homogeneity: Doubling all positions doubles the risk. 
4.  Monotonicity: Risk is not increased by adding position which has no probability of 
loss. 
As already stated, ES is a coherent risk measure. The maximum of the expected loss 
under a set of probability measures or generalized scenarios is also a coherent risk 
measure. (Converse is also true). This implies that SPAN is coherent. 
On the other hand, VaR is not coherent because it is not sub-additive. For example, one 
day before maturity, a short call that has only a 0.75% chance of being exercised has zero 
VaR because the probability of loss is less than 1%. Similarly, a short put that has only a 
0.75% chance of being exercised also has zero VaR. However, a portfolio consisting of 
the short call and the short put has a non zero VaR because there is a 1.5% chance that 
one of the options will be exercised leading to a loss. 
III. Robustness, Regime Switching and Risk Coverage Levels 
Robustness 
The margining benefits provided for calendar spreads or inter-commodity spreads in most 
derivative exchanges globally is a good example of crude but robust models. Though 
correlations are by no means constant, the spread margins or offsets are typically kept 
constant for long periods of time. Moreover, they are set at levels that lead to over 
margining of spread positions relative to what might be indicated by estimated 
correlations. The big advantage is that the margining system is very robust in the face of 
correlation breakdowns and correlation instability.  
Exchanges have been able to use this robust system even in commodities (like energy) 
where there is an active OTC market The higher margins induced by the robust system 
have not led to a flight of the market to the OTC market where margin requirements could 
perhaps be lower. 
I hasten to add that it is the robustness and not the crudeness of the model that is the 
virtue. A Luddite attack on sophisticated models is certainly warranted. I visualize 
sophistication and robustness as orthogonal properties of risk management models. The  
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table below gives examples of risk management models falling in each of the four 
possible combinations of crudeness/sophistication and robustness/fragility: 
Examples of risk management models with different combinations 
of crudeness/sophistication and robustness/fragility 
 Fragile  Robust   
Crude 
Simple leverage 
ratios as in Basel-I 
treatment of the 
banking book. 
Scenario based models 
like SPAN 
Sophisticated 
Normal distribution 
based models like 
Basel-II 
Fat tailed non linear 
dependence models 
 
I believe that risk models must evolve first towards robustness and then towards 
sophistication as shown in the following diagram, because the movement to robust and 
sophisticated models is bound to be long and difficult. In this light, the evolution from 
Basel-I (crude and fragile) to Basel-II (sophisticated and fragile) was a move in the wrong 
direction. 
Risk management models must evolve towards  
greater robustness and then to greater sophistication 
 Fragile  Robust   
 
Crude 
 
 
Sophisticated 
 
 
 
 
Another interesting example of the choice between robustness and sophistication is the 
contrast between the risk management systems at the index futures markets in India and 
Korea. Korea levied a flat 15% margin on index futures for a very long time and did not 
bother to change this margin in response to changing volatility in the market
5. India is at 
the other extreme where the volatility is estimated every day using the RiskMetrics 
(exponentially weighted moving average) methodology. Margins are adjusted every day 
based on the latest estimate of the volatility.  
                                                 
5 I am grateful to the National Stock Exchange for providing me some very useful data on margin 
levels and volatilities for index futures for various countries.   
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Average margin levels in Korea are higher than in many other markets in the world – 
even those markets (like India) where the average volatility is comparable. This excessive 
level of margins provides very high protection against default. Yet, Korea has developed 
one of the largest index futures markets in the world. What this shows is that a crude 
model can provide adequate protection while not impeding market development. 
It could be argued that the more “sophisticated” margining system in India is actually a 
source of systemic risk for the exchange. If margins are revised at a frequency that 
exceeds the ability of the payment system to mobilize funds from the ultimate client, then 
large price movements can result in panic unwinding of levered positions that exacerbates 
the original price movement. This can set up a vicious circle of accelerating volatility and 
margin calls. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that some of the extreme price 
movements in recent years (particularly May 17, 2004 and January 21/22, 2008) have 
witnessed this phenomenon. Bhalla (2008) makes this case very forcefully and 
persuasively. 
Regime Switching or Structural Breaks 
One of the reasons why risk management in the global banking system failed so 
miserably in 2007 and 2008 was because of reliance on historical data confined to the 
“Great Moderation” during which macro-economic and systemic volatility was quite low. 
Haldane (2009) provides the following data for macro-economic volatility in the UK: 
Variable   Volatility (1998-2007)  Volatility (1857-2007) 
GDP growth  0.6%  2.7% 
Earnings growth  0.5%  6.4% 
Inflation 0.9%  5.9% 
Unemployment 0.6%  3.4% 
Table 1: Volatility of UK macroeconomic variables during the Great Moderation 
compared with 150 year average. Source, Haldane (2009) Annex Table 1. 
 
We would all agree that margin levels should have been lower during the Great 
Moderation than earlier. The question is whether the margins during this period should 
have been based only on the observed volatility during this period or whether the margins 
should also have been influenced by the past experience.  
The “structural break” perspective would have argued that there was a structural 
transformation in the economy in the late 1990s which made the earlier data irrelevant  
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and meaningless. In this perspective, the margins would be based only on data from the 
Great Moderation. The “regime switching” perspective would argue that the economy 
operates under different regimes at different points of time and that there is a non trivial 
probability of the regime switching to a more volatile one. In this perspective, the long 
run data is extremely useful and important as it provides the unconditional mean of the 
volatility across several different regime. 
I believe that prudent risk management should be based on a regime switching framework 
and not on a structural break framework. In practice, one may not go so far as to estimate 
a formal Markov switching model because there might not be enough data for such an 
estimation. What is essential is that the risk management model must be robust under the 
assumption that the true data generating process is a regime switching process. 
Risk Coverage Levels 
JP Morgan’s RiskMetrics methodology  focused on the 90% coverage level because as 
they put it “It is our experience that while RiskMetrics VaR estimates provide reasonable 
results for the 90% confidence interval, the methodology does not do as well at the 95% 
and 98% confidence levels.” (JP Morgan/Reuters, 1996, Appendix B). The point is that 
the 5
th and 95
th percentiles are close enough to the middle of the distribution for the 
normal distribution to be regarded as a tolerable approximation. But 90% is too low a risk 
coverage level for most purposes. 
When the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS) introduced the market risk 
amendment to Basel-I in 1996 (BCBS, 1996), they used the 99% VaR level. This too 
appears to be quite a low level of risk coverage because data on on historical default 
experience from international rating agencies like S&P and Moodys would suggest that 
99% corresponds only to a BB credit rating which is a junk bond rating
6. Moreover at a 
daily holding period, it would imply a VaR exceedance every six months or so. However, 
the 10 day holding period in the market risk amendment effectively made it a much 
higher confidence level. 
The Basel choice of 99% was highly influential even outside the banking system. For 
example, when the Indian equity derivative market was first conceptualized (Gupta, 
1998), the 99% VaR was the suggested for the margining system. However, the actual 
                                                 
6  The mapping from risk coverage levels to credit rating here and later in this paper is based on 
the smoothed probabilities of default presented in Table 3 of  Kuritzkes and Schuermann (2008)  
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risk containment system with a multiplicity of margin components (including longer 
holding periods as well as additional components known variously as exposure margin, 
second line of defence or extreme loss margin) delivered protection levels much higher 
than 99%.  
Basel-II credit risk models for the banking book in initial drafts (BCBS, 2001, para 172) 
used 99.5% VaR levels corresponding to credit rating at the border line between BBB- 
and BB+. The final Basel-II credit risk model (BCBS, 2004, para 272) is based on 99.9% 
confidence level corresponding to a credit rating falling a little short of A-. In 2009, the 
Basel Committee proposed that even in the trading book, credit risk should be based on 
99.9% VaR levels (BCBS, 2009, para 12). All these credit risk VaR levels are over a one 
year capital horizon. 
For a derivative clearing corporation, I believe that margins should be based on a risk 
coverage of about 99.95% with a one-day horizon.  (As already indicated, the margins 
should be based on expected shortfall and not on value at risk.) In terms of international 
rating agency standards, 99.95% corresponds roughly to A levels while a clearing 
corporation should be AAA rated. It would be necessary to rely on clearing corporation 
capital, broker capital and other cushions to achieve AAA safety for the clearing 
corporation while margins themselves provide only A level of safety.  
It is doubtful whether it is possible to achieve AAA or even AA safety through margins 
alone because a AA rating would have to be based on the 99.99% tail (and AAA would 
require the 99.997% tail) and these extreme tails are not amenable to reliable statistical 
estimation for fat tailed distributions.  
In any case, exclusive reliance on margins is not a good idea. Since margins can be paid 
out of borrowed funds, they do not constrain the overall leverage in the system. It only 
ensures that when the excessive leverage leads to a failure, the losses fall on external 
sources of leverage and not on the counter parties or on the exchanges. Leverage (whether 
embedded or external) can be a source of systemic risk. A system of capital adequacy for 
brokers and other intermediaries is an essential element of risk containment in the 
derivative markets. Many analysts believe that weak capital adequacy systems for the 
large broker-dealers (investment banks) contributed to the fragility of the financial system 
in the United States in 2007 and 2008.  
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IV. Risk Management in Indian Derivative Markets 
Stock Index Futures   
From the time they were introduced in the beginning of this decade, the Indian equity 
derivative market has worked well without any serious defaults or settlement failures 
despite large volumes and high levels of volatility. To this extent, the risk containment 
system has worked quite well. 
Nevertheless, there have been several serious concerns about the system: 
z  It has been argued with some justification that the high frequency with which 
margins are revised is itself a source of systemic risk (Bhalla, 2008). This has 
been discussed in the previous section. 
z  There has been a growing disconnect between the “Value at Risk” methodology to 
which the risk containment framework pays lip service and the actual system 
(modelled on SPAN) that is closer to modern coherent risk measures like 
“Expected Shortfall”.  
z  The actual risk containment system with a multiplicity of margin components 
(including the  2  scaling as well as additional components known variously as 
exposure margin, second line of defence or extreme loss margin) delivers 
protection levels much higher than the 99% Value at Risk level enshrined in the 
stated regulatory goal.  
Varma (2008) presented an alternative margining system to address the above concerns 
based on analysis using data on the Nifty index for the period 1990-2008. The main 
proposals can be summarized as follows: 
z  It was proposed to set margins at a level equal to eight standard deviations 
corresponding to an expected shortfall measure at confidence level of  99.95%. 
This was to be in replacement of all margins and margin supplements levied 
currently including exposure margin or second line of defence or extreme loss 
margin as well the  2  scaling that is employed currently. 
z  A minimum margin of 8% was proposed to prevent the margin from going too 
low during a “Great Moderation”. The current system also incorporates a 
minimum margin for the same reason. 
z  It was proposed that margins (as a percentage of the underlying) would be revised 
only once a month and changes would be announced with sufficient notice to the 
markets. Specifically, the margin percentage for the next month would be based 
on data available on the 15
th of the current month so that even after allowing for 
lags in computation and dissemination, it is possible to provide reasonable notice 
to the market. 
z  To allow margins to be kept constant for such long periods, the volatility would be 
estimated with lower weight on the last few days of data and more weight on  
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longer stretches of data. Specifically, the smoothing parameter (lambda in 
RiskMetrics/IGARCH) was proposed to be set to 0.995 as opposed to the 0.94 
used currently
7. The value of 0.995 was arrived at by  quasi maximum likelihood 
estimation since this is known to be a consistent and robust estimator for GARCH 
type models even if the distributions have fat tails (Lee and Hansen, 1994).   
Back-test results for the period August 1990 to August 2008 showed that margin 
violations under the proposed system were well under control. In a sample of over 4,300 
trading days, the 99.95% risk coverage requires a consideration of the worst 2 or 3 days.  
The three largest moves in terms of number of standard deviations during the above 
period were the following: 
z  On May 17, 2004, the Nifty dropped 8.63 standard deviations (12.24%) in 
response to some market unfriendly remarks by leaders of the left parties whose 
support was needed for the incoming government.  
z  The Nifty rose by 7.10 standard deviations (12.85%) on March 24, 1992 during 
the securities scam. After the exposure of the scam, the index had three moves of 
more than 10% during April and May 1992, but the volatility estimates by then 
were so high that these moves were less than six standard deviations.  
z  The Nifty rose 6.96 standard deviations (10.44%) on March 1, 1997 in response to 
the “dream budget” the previous day .  
The proposed margining system (eight standard deviations) is slightly in excess of what is 
required to achieve an ES at the 99.95% level
8. A margin level somewhere between 7½ 
and 8 standard deviations would be sufficient. The only margin violation is on May 17, 
2004 where the index movement of 12.24% exceeded the margin of 11.34% by 0.90%.  
The average margins and the range of margins are shown in Table 2. During the recent 
period, the margins range from around 9% to around 16% with an average of about 12%. 
The margins are higher in the more volatile 1990s.  
                                                 
7  Using a high value of λ means that the volatility estimate takes into account a much longer 
period of historical data. When  λ is 0.94, the most recent 11 days account for half the weights 
and the most recent 37 days account of 90% of the weights. When λ is raised to 0.995, the 
corresponding numbers are 138 days and 459 days. Therefore the effect of a wrong initial 
volatility estimate lasts for about 1-2 years when  λ=0.995. On the other hand, with  λ=0.94, the 
initial value affects the estimates only for the first month or so. It is proposed that when λ = 
0.995 is used, the volatility estimates should be initialized on a date at least 3 years in the past 
so that the initial value has a negligible impact on the current volatility estimate. 
8  The 99.95% VaR would require an even lower margin level (below seven standard deviations).  
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Average, minimum and maximum margins  
  1990-2008 1996-2008 2001-08 
Average 13.54% 12.71% 12.09% 
Minimum Not  meaningful
9  9.02%
(August 2003)
9.02% 
(August 2003) 
Maximum  23.94%
(June 1992)
16.85%
(June 2000)
16.24% 
(May 2008) 
Table 2: Average, minimum and maximum margins under the system proposed in 
Varma (2008) and recommended here as well 
 
A structural break perspective might argue that the bad old days of an unreformed capital 
market of the early 1990s are irrelevant in today's environment. If so, a flat 12% margin 
(Korean style) might be as good or better than the proposed system. It gives the same 
level of protection with a lower level of average margins!  
From a regime switching perspective, things look very different. In this perspective, there 
is a non trivial probability that a change in the domestic or global economic environment 
could take us back to the high volatility regime of 1992. The proposed margining system 
is robust in the face of such a regime switch while a 12% flat margin would not be. Yes, a 
15% flat margin would be robust even under a 1992 volatility regime, but that implies a 
significantly higher average margin as the price of the greater simplicity. 
Currency Derivatives 
When exchange traded currency derivatives were introduced in India, the risk 
management system for these products was implicitly drawn from the system used for 
equity derivatives (Reserve Bank of India and Securities and Exchange Board of India, 
2008).  This is in my view a cause for concern because currencies are an ill behaved asset 
class compared to equities.  
First, equities have relatively well defined fundamentals. Second, to a fair approximation, 
equity prices are market clearing prices so that the observed volatility of equity prices 
captures all relevant information about the volatility of supply and demand. Exchange 
rates by contrast have poorly defined fundamentals; purchasing power parity is the closest 
that we have to the fundamentals for exchange rates, but deviations from these 
fundamentals take several years to correct themselves (Lothian and Taylor, 1996). 
Moreover, exchange rates are not often market clearing prices because of large scale 
                                                 
9  Since the margin computations were started off from an artificially low level in July 1990, the 
margins in the first month are low (about 8%), but this is a meaningless number.  
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central bank intervention. As such, highly volatile supply and demand can co-exist with 
low observed volatility of exchange rates. 
The problem is that at some point of time, the central bank might decide to abandon its 
exchange rate stabilization policy and thus cause a large jump in the exchange rate in 
either direction. This is of course the well known peso problem in exchange rate theory. 
The point is that the volatility estimated from past exchange rates contains no information 
relevant to the peso problem risk. When the jump materializes, it appears as a bolt from 
the blue to a GARCH or IGARCH risk model.  
The jump might be less of a surprise to a model that tracks the volatility of reserves in 
addition to the volatility of exchange rates themselves. Even here, however, the timing of 
the jump would come as a surprise though the direction and magnitude of the jump might 
be less surprising. 
I believe that measured exchange rate volatility is a poor measure of the true risk of 
currency derivatives. In particular, GARCH and IGARCH models perform quite badly in 
the rupee-dollar exchange rate (Varma, 1999). There are broadly two alternatives for risk 
management of currency derivatives: 
1.  It is possible to have a flat margin that is completely unresponsive to currency 
market conditions. The rationale for such a system would be that currency risk is 
dominated by jump risk and this risk is unpredictable (at least in respect to the 
timing of the jump). The simplest robust margin system is one that assumes that a 
jump could happen at any time and imposes a margin that protects against a fairly 
large jump at all times. After the introduction of market determined exchange 
rates (LERMS) in March 1992, the most extreme percentage move in the rupee 
dollar rate was the 3% move on September 14, 1995. A flat margin set at this level 
would provide coverage at the 99.95% level over this period. From a regime 
switching perspective, however, one would worry about two things: 
◦ The devaluation of the currency in mid 1991 and early 1992 during the transition 
to managed floating was several times this level. 
◦ Other emerging market currencies comparable to India in terms of the size of the 
economy, the level of foreign exchange reserves and the quality of national 
leadership have witnessed much larger single day moves at times of crisis (for 
example, Korea in the last quarter of 2008). 
2.  It is possible to design a margining system that responds to the volatility of supply 
and demand as measured not only by exchange rate volatility but also the 
volatility of foreign exchange reserves and interest rates. Implied volatility of 
currency options (particularly risk reversals) might also provide valuable 
information. Risk management systems that take this approach would attempt to 
predict the timing of jumps and impose high margins only when the probability of 
jumps is quite high.  
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In this light, I worry about the potential risk that the Indian currency futures market could 
turn out to be seriously under margined at times of stress. Needless to say, the same risk 
exists in OTC currency positions as well. 
Interest Rate Derivatives 
Interest rate derivatives are somewhere in between stocks and currencies in terms of 
having better defined fundamentals than currencies and less exposure to the peso 
problem. Nevertheless, interest rates are exposed to moderate jump risk. Moreover, the 
volatility of interest rates may need to be supplemented by the volatility of key elements 
of the central bank balance sheet (including but not limited by foreign exchange reserves). 
Also, the higher volatility of interest rates on and around monetary policy announcements 
needs to be factored into the risk management system. 
In the Indian context, a structural break perspective would ignore the extreme volatility 
observed on January 16, 1998 as belonging to a different era. From a regime switching 
perspective, this is precisely the kind of volatility that could easily return to the market at 
times of exchange rate stress. I would believe that a robust risk management system in 
interest rate products should assess the likelihood of such stress by measuring the 
volatility of exchange rates, interest rates and key central bank balance sheet components. 
V. Beyond SPAN: The future of risk management
10 
As argued in Section I, derivative exchanges have by and large avoided the worst of the 
three pitfalls of value at risk, normal distributions and linear correlations that have sunk 
other risk management systems. This paper argues however, that there are significant 
advantages in designing risk management systems that explicitly incorporate coherent 
risk measures, fat tailed distributions and non linear dependence structure.  
Advances in computing power over the last two decades make it feasible to do this. 
Moore’s law says that computing power doubles every eighteen months or so; over the 
last 15 years, the impact of Moore’s law is to bring about a thousand fold increase in 
computational power. We can today contemplate risk models that require a thousand 
times as much computations as the models of the early 1990s.  
                                                 
10  This section draw heavily on Varma (2007)  
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Coherent Risk Measures 
In addition to the four core axioms defining coherence, Artzner et al also proposed an 
Axiom of Relevance:  “Position that can never make a profit but can make a loss has 
positive risk”. For scenario based measures, the requirement can be stated differently as 
requiring consideration of a Wide Range of Scenarios: “Convex hull of generalized 
scenarios should contain physical and risk neutral probability measures.” 
Though, SPAN is a coherent risk measure, it does not satisfy this additional requirement 
because in my opinion, it has too few scenarios. For example, if the price scanning range 
is set at ±3σ, then there are no scenarios between 0 and σ which covers a probability of 
34% under the normal distribution. 
To see the difficulties that this creates, consider a short butterfly (two long calls close to 
the money and two short calls – one at a higher strike and the other at a lower strike). This 
portfolio loses the maximum money when the underlying is close to the strike of the long 
calls – this is due to the decay of the option premiums of these long calls. If all the strikes 
are close together, it is possible for this maximum loss to occur at a point in between two 
SPAN scenarios and the SPAN risk measure underestimates the true loss as seen in 
Figure 1.  
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There are two possible solutions to the problem of non linear positions that have large 
losses in between two scenarios: 
1.  We can increase the number of scenarios. If the risk is defined in terms of the 
worst 1% outcomes (99% VaR or ES), it would make sense to have a scenario at 
each percentile of the distribution of the underlying. With today’s computational 
power, this increase in the number of scenarios is eminently affordable. If risk is 
defined at higher coverage levels (99.95% VaR or ES), the increase in the number 
of scenarios can prove challenging. 
2.  With the same set of scenarios, we can estimate the risk of option positions better 
by using a delta-gamma approximation. The portfolio values and deltas at 
neighbouring scenarios allows the gamma of the portfolio to be estimated. The 
delta-gamma approximation is equivalent to fitting a quadratic curve that passes 
through the scenario points. The maximum loss under this quadratic curve can be 
determined analytically without computing any additional scenarios. This is 
shown in Figure 2. 
SPAN Underestimates the Risk of a Short Butterfly
Dotted lines are SPAN price scenarios
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True Risk
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Figure 1: The true risk is significantly higher than the risk as measured by 
SPAN for a short butterfly (two long calls close to the money and two short calls 
– one at a higher strike and the other at a lower strike). This portfolio loses the 
maximum money when the underlying is close to the strike of the long calls. In 
this diagram, the central strike falls between two scenarios and the other strikes 
are close to these scenarios. The maximum loss occurs at a price between two 
scenarios.  
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Both the alternatives – increasing the number of scenarios and using a delta-gamma 
approximation can be combined to get even higher accuracy.  
The delta-gamma approximation provides a way of estimating the ES without too much 
additional effort. The approximation represents the loss as a piece wise quadratic function 
– between two scenarios, the loss is represented by a quadratic function. This quadratic 
can be integrated analytically over the interval between two neighbouring scenarios. By 
adding up the integrals over the various intervals, we obtain the ES of the portfolio. 
Fat Tails 
The delta gamma approximation discussed above does not adequately address the tails of 
the loss distribution. The problem can be reduced by adding scenarios in the far tails. 
SPAN already has the idea of extreme scenarios which are weighted less than other 
scenarios while considering the worst case loss. It is possible to extend this idea further 
by considering even more extreme scenarios with even lower weights.  Beyond the 
furthest scenario, it is necessary to use a delta approximation (it is not possible to use a 
delta-gamma approximation).  
Improved Estimate of the Risk of a Short Butterfly
Dotted lines are SPAN price scenarios
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Blue crosses are delta-
gamma approximation 
using values and deltas 
at SPAN scenario prices
Figure 2: The risk measurement of the short butterfly of Figure 1 can be 
improved by using a delta-gamma approximation.   
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In addition, it is convenient to assume that the tail follows a power law
11. In this case, ES 
can be approximated
12 in the tails using the tail index:  VaR
h
h
= ES
1 −
.  
With this approximation, we have a robust risk measure (approximate ES) that satisfies 
the core axioms of coherence as well as the axiom of relevance. 
Multiple Underlyings: Correlations and Copulas 
Derivative exchanges have used a very conservative approach to the problem of 
correlations. SPAN simply aggregates margins across underlyings without any benefit  
for diversification and portfolio hedges. The only exception is that it provides some 
margin offsets for inter commodity spreads in closely related underlyings. This very 
conservative approach has helped derivative exchanges to weather many financial crises 
without serious distress. 
Banking regulators on the other hand allow banks to uses correlations and assume 
multivariate normality to compute the portfolio risk with full benefit of diversifications 
and portfolio hedges. During periods of turmoil, however, correlation are often unstable 
and the assumed diversification benefits may disappear. Extreme price movements are 
more correlated than usual (for example, crash of 1987, dot com bubble of 1999 and the 
turmoil of 2007-08). It is not possible to protect the exchange simply by assuming a 
higher correlation than the historical average. This is because low correlation under 
margins long-only portfolios while high correlation under margins long-short portfolios. 
Therefore instability of correlations in either direction can be dangerous for the risk 
managers. 
Instability is difficult to model because if correlations vary over time, historical data 
becomes less useful to estimate the dependence. A different perspective has however 
gained ground in recent years. This is the view that the dependence between two 
underlyings is stable but non linear. Non linear dependence can account for the high 
correlation of extreme movements and the modest correlation of mild movements. It can 
also account for asymmetric dependence relationships where the dependence is different 
in rising and falling markets. Correlations are a poor measure of non linear dependence. 
                                                 
11  The normal distribution has exponentially declining tails – the density is proportional to e
− x
2
2 . 
Fat tailed distributions have tails that decline more slowly. The density is proportional to x
− h
 
where h is the tail index. 
12  This approximation is used implicitly in the second line of defence in the margining system of 
Indian exchange traded derivatives (Varma, 2002, Section 4.1).   
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For example if x lies between –1 and +1 and 
2 x = y , then x and y are uncorrelated though 
y is perfectly dependent on x. 
Copulas provide the mathematical machinery to model non linear dependence. They are 
the way to go to measure risk at a portfolio level without relying on ad hoc margin 
offsets. 
The gaussian copula postulates a linear relationship between two variables. If the 
correlation is zero then the two variables are unrelated. This is shown in the scatter 
diagram in Figure 3 which presents a circular pattern. There are hardly any instances of a 
simultaneous extreme movement in both variables. It is well known that the gaussian 
copula implies negligible tail dependence. 
 
Figure 3: The gaussian copula with zero correlation produces a scatter plot 
which is circular. There are very few observations involving simultaneous 
extreme moves of both x and y.  
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This must be contrasted with the non linear dependence of the t-copula shown in Figure 4. 
Here also the correlation is zero signifying the absence of a linear relationship. The two 
variables are individually normally distributed as in the earlier diagram. However, there is 
a non linear dependence. The scatter plot looks like a square and simultaneous extreme 
movements in both variables are seen. If we were modelling the relationship using 
correlations, then in times of market stress, it would appear that two previously 
uncorrelated variables have become highly correlated. In fact, the dependence 
relationship has been stable but was non linear to begin with. 
 
Multivariate normality (the gaussian copula) is computationally very attractive – it solves 
the curse of dimensionality as the portfolio distribution is univariate normal. To retain 
computational tractability, the use of a unidimensional mixture of multivariate normals is 
attractive as it reduces to numerical integral in one dimension. With modern 
Figure 4: A t-copula with zero correlation produces a scatter diagram which 
looks like a square rather than a circular. The tail dependence is seen in 
simultaneous extreme moves in both x and y  
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computational power a univariate numerical integration in one dimension is quite 
feasible. 
This makes multivariate t (t copula with t marginals) very attractive as it is an inverse 
gamma mixture of multivariate normals. Other univariate mixtures are possible.  
To use copulas, we must fit a marginal distribution to the portfolio losses for each 
underlying and apply the copula to these marginals. SPAN with enough scenarios allows 
us to approximate the distribution. If we wish to fit a distribution from a parametric 
family of distributions, it is essential that we fit the distribution to match the tails well. 
This implies that we must match tail quantiles in addition to matching moments. 
The Adverse Selection Problem 
The clearing corporation provides a service similar to that of insurance and the concept of 
adverse selection is applicable to it as well. In this context, the margins imposed by the 
clearing corporation play a role similar to the premium charged by insurance companies. 
Adverse selection therefore implies that positions that are under-margined would be 
heavily used while those that are over-margined would be less popular. Even if the 
margins were right on average for randomly chosen positions, they would be too low for 
the actual positions chosen by traders. 
Adverse selection arises essentially because as emphasized in the limits to arbitrage 
literature, arbitrage is often constrained by leverage. Arbitrageurs therefore seek under- 
margined portfolios.  
We can think of this as a two stage game: 
z  Exchange moves first – announces the SPAN scenarios 
z  Arbitrageur moves second – chooses portfolios 
The interesting question is whether we can reverse this order of moves. Can the scenarios 
be tailored to the portfolio in a transparent pre-announced fashion. For example, the 
exchange might say that it would add scenarios at prices corresponding to the five strikes 
at which option positions are most heavily concentrated.  
On deeper thought, it is not necessary to really do this on a portfolio by portfolio basis. 
Defaults by a few traders is not damaging to the exchange. What is critical is large scale 
or systemic defaults. The exchange (or its clearing corporation) is short options on each 
trader’s portfolio with strike equal to portfolio margin. The position of the clearing house  
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is thus a portfolio of such short options. One can then ask the question: What price 
scenarios would create the worst loss to exchange (aggregated across all traders)? The 
exchange can then add these scenarios to the margining system dynamically. 
The determination of the worst loss scenarios might appear to be the same as stress 
testing, but it is actually an “inverse problem.” Instead of starting with specified scenarios 
and finding the loss under these scenarios, the idea is to specify an extreme loss level and 
determine the most likely scenario that could lead to this loss. Fournie, Lasry and Lions 
(1997) present some promising ideas on solving a similar problem by computing 
Finslerian geodesic paths.  
VI. Conclusion 
Derivative exchanges have fared much better banks during the global financial crisis as 
their models were more robust even if they appeared crude in comparison to the internal 
models of the large banks. This is an important lesson and risk managers must continue to 
emphasize robustness  in their models. Sophistication and market calibration should never 
be pursued at the cost of robustness. 
However, it would be a mistake for exchanges to become complacent about their 
margining systems. Risk management is a rapidly evolving field with new methods being 
developed constantly. Growing computational power is also making previously infeasible 
approaches increasingly practicable. Risk managers must be continually striving to adopt 
the best models that are both robust and computationally tractable. 
Derivative exchanges in India need to look carefully at their margining methodology and 
eliminate certain elements that could contribute to the fragility of the risk management 
system. Specific recommendations have been given in the paper about stock index futures 
and currency futures. Similar analyses have to be performed about other derivative 
products as well.  
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